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| At random: ENS Sam Hunter, the first submarine casualty of WWII on Dec. 8, 1941. He was attached to Sea Dragon moored next to Sealion. He was killed by shrapnel from the first bomb hit on Sealion penetrating the conning tower of Sea Dragon. The second hit killed 4 men in Sealions Engineroom. |
 Interesting site about China MilitaryModerators: Jump to page : 1 Now viewing page 1 [25 messages per page] | |
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Plankowner Posts: 9165 Location: Upper lefthand corner of the map. | Subject: Interesting site about China Military http://geimint.blogspot.com/2007/08/chinese-military-modernization.html They have an 80% scale Nimitz carrier set up. Click on the pictures. | ||
| Thomas Courtien |
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| Master and Commander Posts: 1890 Location: Patterson, New York | Subject: Op Ed on China and the Pacific Interesting link - this was in today's paper OPINION ASIA - Wall Street Journal SEPTEMBER 21, 2009, 4:00 P.M. ET Is the U.S. Losing the Pacific? The trend isn't America's friend. By MARY KISSEL Honolulu From the tranquil vantage point of Pacific Command's headquarters here at Camp H.M. Smith, overlooking Pearl Harbor, it's hard to recall the postcards from China that have jolted this command's peace of mind. Yet they are there: in 2004, when a Chinese Han-class nuclear submarine was spotted cruising near Japan's Miyako island; in 2006, when a Chinese Song-class submarine, armed with torpedoes and antiship cruise missiles, surfaced less than five miles from the USS Kitty Hawk carrier battle group off Okinawa; and in March, when a coterie of Chinese ships harassed the USNS Impeccable, an unarmed U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in international waters off Hainan Island. All sides counseled calm in these incidents, and none more so than the admiral in charge of Pacific Command, the U.S. military's biggest combatant command. The current chief, Timothy J. Keating, travels the region, as his predecessors before him, preaching the virtues of engagement. "It's not like we're going to go charging around the Pacific with our chin thrust out," he tells me. "Quite the contrary: We want to ease around the Pacific." China is not a "threat." Yet the tone of his public message is so resoundingly and consistently upbeat that it's starting to bring into question the Command's credibility and worry America's allies about the Navy's muscularity in the face of a rising China. Call it the Pacific Command conundrum: How to talk frankly about threats and reassure U.S. allies while not goading Beijing needlessly? That's not to say the U.S. military will lose its preeminence in Asia-Pacific anytime soon. PaCom, as it's known, has an area of responsibility stretching from India to the west coast of California—over half the world's physical space—and boasts approximately 325,000 personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. The Pacific Fleet alone has "five aircraft carrier strike groups, approximately 180 ships, 1,500 aircraft and 100,000 personnel" according to official figures. China's navy has, according to the Pentagon's latest estimate, "over 60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and approximately 70 missile-equipped patrol craft." As since World War II, the U.S. military is what keeps the peace in the Pacific and allows this region to prosper. Yet the trend is not in America's favor. The Obama administration has curbed the Navy's expansion plans and sent signals that it doesn't believe in expanding missile defense. Beijing has meanwhile poured money into access denial capabilities, including antiship ballistic missiles, cyberwarfare and antisatellite weapons. The American Enterprise Institute's Dan Blumenthal estimates that China has added around three submarines to its fleet every year since 1995. The U.S. submarine fleet, by contrast, is shrinking. It's the same story for fighter jets: China is ramping up its fifth-generation technology, while the U.S. has capped the production of stealth F-22 fighters. The Iraq and Afghanistan engagements are also sapping personnel normally assigned to PaCom. Little wonder that in its defense white paper projecting out to 2030, Australia predicted "the rise of China, the emergence of India and the beginning of the end of the so-called unipolar moment; the almost two-decade-long period in which the pre-eminence of our principal ally, the United States, was without question." Andrew Shearer, national security advisor to former Australian Prime Minister John Howard, says no one in Asia wants a "fractious" U.S.-China relationship, but equally, "nor do U.S. allies want the U.S. to be a pushover." "When someone is kicking sand in your face and you continue to lie back on your beach towel, that's a risk," he quips. Admiral Keating dismisses these worries as not "an accurate or valid prediction." He deftly punts the question of budget cuts: "There are decisions being made in the Department that could have longer-term implications for us in the Pacific community." When asked what he would do if he had more resources, he gives the stock answer: "more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance." As regards China, Adm. Keating wants to engage, engage, engage: "We would like to work more closely with their military. We would like to understand their strategy better than we do. We want to get a much better grasp for their intentions: short-, mid- and long range," he says. Yet it's unclear what this stance has accomplished. Only a few months after taking his job, in May 2007, Adm. Keating held a news conference in Beijing and said if China chose to develop an aircraft carrier program, the U.S. would "help them to the degree that they seek and the degree that we're capable, in developing their programs." That offer was quickly shelved back in Washington. Earlier this month, he suggested the U.S., Australia and China should hold a joint exercise together—which also came as a surprise to many back in Washington. China still hasn't responded to the offer. Meanwhile the Chinese are aggressively defending their ever-more muscular naval stance: "The way to resolve China-U.S. maritime incidents is for the U.S. to change its surveillance and survey operations policies against China, decrease and eventually stop such operations," China's Defense Ministry declared last month. No nuanced talk of "engagement" there. Admiral Keating himself has a hard time citing what has changed for the better vis-à-vis China in his two-and-a-half years at the PaCom helm, besides the resumption of military-to-military talks (which the Chinese unilaterally suspended in October 2008) and the fact that since 2007, "we haven't had a ship visit denied." The transparency of China's military intentions is "less than completely fulfilling." U.S. military exchanges with the Chinese are "very limited." The missiles Beijing has pointed at Taiwan are "not insignificant in terms of quantity." In sum, "there is no question that we are going to have to deal with a Chinese military that is increasing in quantity and in some areas, quality, over the Chinese military of 20 years ago," the admiral admits. That's the kind of frankness that U.S. allies want to hear, and that the Obama administration and Congressional defense appropriators need to hear. Admiral Keating will hand over the PaCom reins next month to the current commander of the Pacific Fleet, Adm. Robert Willard. Before he takes the job, Adm. Willard may want to review those Chinese military postcards and figure out just how much room the U.S. wants to give China in the Pacific in the years to come. Ms. Kissel is editor of The Wall Street Journal Asia's editorial page. | ||
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